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Ethics, Deception, and 'Those Milgram Experiments'

C. D. HERRERA

abstract Critics who allege that deception in psychology experiments is unju

cite Stanley Milgram's 'obedience experiments' as evidence. These critics sa

for justification tend to downplay the risks involved and overstate the be

research. Milgram, they add, committed both sins. Critics are right to point

oversight is often susceptible to self-serving abuse. But stating a priori how

experiment will be is a tall order for psychologists, or anyone else. At the s

themselves have difficulty in showing what is wrong with deception, and how

experiments suffer. Hence, it becomes unclear what the psychologists, inclu

prone to downplay. There is also room to wonder how the Milgram studies c
debate over deception. Although Milgram probably exaggerated the scientific

own work, critics who exaggerate its moral and historical significance do lit
status of deception.

Rethinking the Benefits of 'Justified' Deception

What are we to make of that unique practice associated with some psyc
ments, the intentional deception of the research subjects? Psychologists

are not using malicious or garden-variety deception, but deception

kind. They are quick to assure critics that these subjects will endure m
any, while participating. Indeed, some give the impression that there i
over deception:

many of the ethical sermons being preached to social scientists seem
that those participating in research projects would never encounter
comforts if they did not participate in the research . . . deceptive inf
presented at every turn, particularly in advertising and political spe
a salesman deliberately deceives a prospective customer, he makes no
after the sale, to reveal this deception. If social scientists were no so
subjects would not be aware of the deception and, hence, not so upse
their treatment. [1]

Psychologists, at least the few who resort to deception, claim further
conceal some details of a proposed study from prospective subjects. A f
subject will be a 'reactive' one, the thinking goes. It is hard enough to
behaviour in a campus laboratory; why add to the challenge by letting
what the psychologists are up to? Whole areas of human behaviour wou
be off limits to research if psychologists had to be completely open an
they seek volunteers.

© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2001, Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, U
Maiden, MA 02148, USA.
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Critics remain unconvinced by this appeal to research needs, and b
deception being innocuous. For some, the trouble starts with the wa
give an accounting of their work. Although specific procedures vary

and institutions, as a general rule it falls to something like an I

Board to evaluate the psychologist's promise of benefit over risk in
Psychologists offer a risk-benefit projection to the Review Board, a
the Board members over, they then try to convince prospective sub
the same projection. It is probably true that this arrangement forc
pull off a bit of a public-relations victory. If they cannot convince

accept the picture of risks and benefits, the process comes to a

never meets subject. Once they pass review, the psychologists still h

to accept the risk-benefit package, or Institutional approval bec

stands to reason that if at any stage in this process benefits seem m
will end before it begins.
Some
sustain
tied to
mittee

Boards have a hand in determining whether the psychologis
the work. This is a concern in the US, for instance, where g
ethical review, and where Federal Regulations can stipulate t
review all human-subject research before any individual rese

funds [2]. In this scenario, judgments about morality and methods a
dole. The practical effect is one of giving psychologists (and other
cial incentive to meet a moral guideline. All of this might work to a p
finances are not at issue, one recent critic is probably right to accuse

of exaggerating. The psychologists, he argues, are liable to exag

benefits of their work, and to minimize any talk of risks when they

Review Boards [3]. Critics grow especially impatient when 'assessme
ists of the importance of their own research amount to no more th

Clearing the Way for Researcher Modesty
On one hand, hype seems particularly out of place in human research. The system of
oversight clearly fails if researchers can talk-up the benefits of their research as a way to

gain access to human volunteers. Nor does it help matters when the same psychologists
who talk of justifying deception offer claims of benefit that are hard to take seriously.

One psychologist would have critics believe that subjects in a deceptive experiment
benefit by receiving such things as a 'balanced and interesting summary of relevant
knowledge at the time of the participation,' 'a handout that is carefully edited, clear,
simple, and devoid of professional jargon,' or 'a cheerful and friendly offer to discuss
any of the material' [5], This sounds either misleading or naive. Subjects could readily
receive 'benefits' like these without deception taking place. It is not even clear why
anyone would have to serve in an experiment, deceptive or not, to receive these
benefits. This is important, since in the research marketplace, subjects and Review
Boards are wise to guard against this kind of false advertising from psychologists. The
trade-off of risks and benefits only makes sense if subjects and society receive some
thing that offsets the deception, that would be unavailable without it.
On the other hand, in trying to protect subjects we should not place the hurdles of
clarity and utility so high that no psychologist can clear them. We can reasonably ask
© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2001
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for restraint from critics when assessing benefit claims, even those that seem far-fetched

initially. It is also unfair to blame all psychologists who deceive for not being able to
offer accurate, objective accounts of the benefits that will come from their work. They
are advertising something yet to occur, after all. Psychologists tweak human subjects to
see what happens. This restricts them to a forward-looking model of assessment, which
ensures that they will not have unassailable projections of benefits. Judgments of relev
ance or utility vary according to a number of factors, few of which are known before
the research. This follows from the way that values in society shift back and forth, not
always in concert with values expressed in research programmes. There has lately been

increased interest in exploration of behaviour related to drug use and 'casual' sex. It
may be years before the value of these studies becomes apparent, or before we realize
that we were wrong to reject a given study.
The problem is not that psychologists are unable to read the future, or that decep

tion hopelessly complicates things. Deception attracts scrutiny, but can have little
relation to the problem of predicting benefits. Rather, the utilitarian, risk-benefit model

provides for only tentative agreement on the most basic of questions, including which
descriptions of present or future conditions should prevail [6]. No matter who defines

'benefit,' and whether or not deception occurs, there will remain an appearance of
arbitrary selection until the dust settles and all can assess the research with hindsight.

Experimental psychologists are also up against a pervasive, negative bias. Their
methods are viewed by some as flawed from the outset. Critics warn, for example,
that the null-hypothesis tests and other statistical tools that psychologists occasionally
employ in their experimental designs can 'confirm' hypotheses that were spurious to
begin with [7], Where this kind of confirmation occurs, there will in principle be no
benefit from the experiment. Critics also question the social context of experimenta
tion itself, and the validity that laboratory findings have in the real world [8]. These

complaints are not new. Doubts about method are as old as experimental social psy
chology. Setting aside the merits of these concerns, they cannot help but leave an
impression with members of the Review Board. Put simply, psychologists who deceive
are in a bind. They cannot afford to sound as though they are inflating their projection
of benefits. Psychologists cannot allow their research to appear trivial either, or the
project won't seem to cover the costs of deception.
Both science and its moral assessment proceed on good faith. If we are going to ask
psychologists for meaningful projections about their results, they deserve a method of
assessment that does not penalize modesty. We can't, in other words, offer apparent
rewards for false advertising and then punish psychologists who take the bait. Not only
that, with the usual uncertainty about where an experiment will lead, critics must avoid
the moral hubris of claiming to know, sometimes on the basis of few details, which
research is sufficiently important to balance the use of deception. We should also bear
in mind that where psychologists can anticipate a negative bias against deception, they
may have still more reason to inflate their accounts of their own work.

The Question of Risk

This bias becomes a problem in the review process where psychologists turn to
describing the risks in their studies as well. Psychologists confront a common view that
Society for Applied Philosophy, 2001
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their deception is more harmful than they let on. Clarke warns that 't
to formally quantify the benefits of any particular piece of social sc

weigh these against the costs to the participants' [9]. Codes of Eth
experiments that involve significant risks, Clarke notes, but he find
ant' so vague [that] there is considerable scope for psychologists to ig
tion and keep their cost-benefit analyses straightforward' [10].
Once more, the critic is onto something. We should all be wary
guard the henhouse, and that may be what happens when we let psy
with their own versions of just how significant the risks are. Subjec
also be able to count on a fair description of the hazards, if any, tha
lab. For their part, psychologists are certainly aware of the drawbac
and of the perils that lie in underestimating risk. They may have
responding to critics. But we should not suggest that psychologis
moral issues that deception raises, or that it is typical to exploit loos
risk. Some psychologists have taken an active role in trying to fi
deception involves. At a time when deception was of little conce
outside experimental psychology, E. Vinacke called for empirical, obj
the effects that deception might have on subjects [11]. A proliferati
since provided scant evidence that deception bothers subjects [12]
chologists in another bind. If empirical evidence shows that there ar
harmful effects from deception, what language can psychologists use

them appear to be hiding something?
In the interest of good faith, just as we call upon psychologists to sp

that deception provides, critics should meet some measure of clar

about risks. This would give those who use deception less reason to e
dressing. It is not easy to say what, specifically, is wrong with dece
in that direction should take centre stage in this debate. Speculation
should lead the way to empirical tests. Critics have claimed that dece
respect for honesty and institutions [13]. They have also warned tha
lead to a negative reputation for psychologists. Yet charges like this
there is no real way to validate them. Perhaps the continued use of deception may
exacerbate the trend towards cynicism and deception in all facets of life, from market
ing to politics to science. Undergraduates, the subjects of choice in psychology experi
ments, have no doubt lost a great deal of respect for institutions and the principle of

honesty over the last half-century. It is routine for these students to 'volunteer' in
experiments, some of which involve deception, as part of their introductory psychology
courses. But if a link exists between student attitudes and the participation in these
experiments, critics should produce evidence for it. The available evidence shows that

subjects give only passing concern to deception [14]. With decades of research that
appears to show little or no harm from deception, what are psychologists to be more
specific about when projecting risks?
Some critics perhaps think that if the numbers are not on their side, first-person
accounts might carry the day. One former graduate student in psychology describes the
stress he felt while deceiving subjects [15]. After recounting the rigours of the lab, he
asks why the teaching and practice of psychology should involve such things. A former
experimental psychologist describes the 'deception researcher's personal dilemma' this
way:
Society for Applied Philosophy, 2001
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either one successfully dissociates the carefully crafted manipulativeness that
characterizes the relationship with research subjects from relationships with
people outside the laboratory, or one does not. In the first case, we should worry
about the impact of the inauthentic relationship on the subject, and about the
researcher's learning to systematically shut off ethically central aspects of his
or her personality, as for example, learning to lie with a completely straight

face and a clear conscience. [16]
Stress and moral misgivings should never be taken lightly. But research oversight is
meant to protect subjects, not researchers. And in that light, how would we integrate
testimonials like this into the debate over deception? What we really seem to need are
in-depth, detailed testimonials from subjects, something that a review process might
require of psychologists during the debriefing phase of the research. Lacking something
like that, we cannot fairly integrate references to 'carefully crafted manipulativeness' in
the 'relationship with research subjects' into the case against deception, even if these

do come from researchers close to the action. This is especially so, given that senti
ments like those quoted seem based on a misunderstanding about how subjects truly
feel about the deception. The rhetoric of a researhcer being forced to 'systematically
shut off ethically central aspects' of his personality loses its effect when we consider
that the subjects in general do not see deception as wrong. Unless purported appeals
to 'a clear conscience' are grounded in reality, they tell us more about the critic than
the underlying issues.

Concern for Autonomy

Some commentators charge that deceptive experiments violate the subject's auto
nomy, and that deception runs counter to the 'doctrine of informed consent' [17].
This doctrine critics associate with 'the biomedical sciences.' [18] There, we are told,
deception of any form is wrong. Commentators who make such arguments frequently
appeal to the Kantian notion that no one should be used solely as a means to another's

end. They rightly point out the value in autonomy-based arguments, which rein
force the idea that we cannot reduce all potential risks from deception to empirical
effects:

Which elements are recorded in the cost-benefit ledger as benefits or costs for
the persons involved and show the contract to be an overall profit or loss? ... If
we are to enumerate tentatively the costs and benefits of the experiment,

intuition and nonscientific experience, introspection and speculation must
supplement the scanty hard empirical data that the scientific community has

agreed to consider more valuable. [19]
Most importantly, these concerns about autonomy and respect highlight an underlying

tension in this debate. Codes of Ethics urge psychologists to respect the dignity of
subjects, to preserve the subject's autonomy, and so on. [20] The same Codes typically
allow for deception where the benefits are sufficient and risks are minimal. How are

researchers to reconcile what at least sounds like a contradictory position? [21] Can
psychologists cater to autonomy while deceiving?
Society for Applied Philosophy, 2001
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There is reason to think that if we carefully define deception, and

its use, autonomy needn't be threatened. In cases where autonom

still is a need to show that the violation amounted to some form of h

To take the extreme case, we can agree that when psychologists deceive subjects
with no advance warning they are using those subjects as means to an end that the sub
jects cannot share. But it does not follow that this represents abuse, any more than
less than complete disclosure at the time of consent has to be antithetical to autonomy.
In more typical cases, psychology experiments might involve selective disclosure of
information, ideally using terms of participation that the subjects have helped con
struct. In medical research, subjects in a clinical trial might participate knowing that
researchers are purposely withholding some information from them. In the same way,
psychologists could tell subjects in a psychology experiment that they are deliberately
withholding or even misrepresenting details about the study. If a subject understands
that she is consenting on the basis of incomplete information, her autonomy isn't
violated. This type consent is not unlike the consent that a patient gives to the use of
anesthesia during surgery. Both seem at first to give up a measure of personal control,
for the sake of an end that they adopt. Far from demanding that subjects relinquish
autonomy, this kind of consent would allow them to express their individual con
ception of it [22]. Of course, Review Boards would still have to make the second-hand
judgment about whether subjects are told enough to rationally decide. The key is that
once subjects waive their right to complete information, deception per se is no longer
involved.

A critic might maintain that this kind of voluntary transfer of autonomy is inherently

wrong. But that position would refuse to let subjects set their own limits on risk-taking.

Such a position, coming from Kantians, is an oddly paternalistic one [23]. It would
protect subjects from risks that they are willing to take, sometimes depriving them

of benefits. Hesitation to allow researchers the option of selective deception and
withholding can stem from a fear that psychology will thus deviate from the doctrine of

informed consent. This fear is misplaced, because there is no universal 'Doctrine' to
speak of. There are general principles (e.g., justice, non-maleficence) that apply to all
human research. The Nuremberg code takes what is practically a non-deception stance

in its application of these general principles. It calls for full and informed consent
before an experiment begins. But the major Codes devised since Nuremberg, including
the Helsinki Code, takes a more liberal stance on what researchers can withhold from

subjects. [24] Not surprisingly, the rationale for this relaxed standard is the familiar

trade-off between prospective risks and benefits. The more the risks appear to be
minimal, the more justified the deception is. [25]

There is reason enough to doubt that psychologists should be held to a standard
derived from a medical-research Code. We could justify variations in the way that
concern for autonomy and informed consent finds application in human studies partly
on the likelihood that subjects in a clinical trial stand to gain, and to risk harm, in

a very different way from that in which subjects in a psychology experiment do.
A blanket application of informed consent over all areas of human research blurs im
portant differences, and unjustly restrains psychologists. The most compelling reason

to adopt separate standards is that if subjects in psychology aren't harmed now, we
won't protect them by increasing the restriction on the use of deception. That is, we
won't make psychology experiments morally equivalent to medical research simply by
Society for Applied Philosophy, 2001
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invoking a non-deception clause. I don't suggest that all values in the research context
fit readily into categories of risk or benefit, or that we have to define hartn in empirical
terms. There is still much to learn about the effects of deception, and research par
ticipation in general. Having conceded this, however, it remains to be seen why in our

concern over deception we would want to move towards a universal standard of
informed consent when there is so far no universal form of human study. The history
of medical research includes some very serious abuses of deception, incomplete dis

closure, and coerced participation. But applying a medical-ethics code to psychology
research seems a poor response to these abuses.

What of those Milgram Experiments?
This gets at another common feature of anti-deception arguments. At some point in
many critiques of deception, commentators refer to a well-known series of psychology

experiments, the studies of obedience that Stanley Milgram conducted in the early
1960s [26]. When Clarke, for instance, claims that subjects could be harmed by
learning unpleasant things about themselves in an experiment that involved deception,
he reminds us of this slice of the history of psychology. 'Many participants in the
Milgram obedience studies,' he claims
found out something unexpected about themselves; that they were more prone
to obey authority figures than they might have supposed. While there may
sometimes be long-term benefits to individuals to be derived from gaining this
information about themselves, such self-discoveries can often be harmful rather
than beneficial. [27]
Diana Baumrind was first to criticize Milgram, and she too charged that his research
exposed subjects to an unwelcome side of themselves [28], She described this process
as 'inflicted insight.'
This line of criticism has from the beginning appeared to have a momentum of its

own. The continuing references to Milgram's self-described studies into 'destructive
obedience' provide even more support for the negative bias against deception. It is in
some quarters taken for granted that this harm to subject self-esteem occurred during
Milgram's research, and that the potential for similar harm precludes justification of
deception today. Among critics, Milgram has achieved mythical, though eminently
useful, status. As with most myths, there is a complex web of fact and supposition to
sort through. For example, Milgram did lead his subjects to believe that they were
physically harming each other, and he did employ what was meant to look like a device
that generated the electrical shocks. But the device was a phony, and no one was really
shocked.

This means that the only possible harm had to come to the subjects, who wrongly
believed that they were shocking people. Here the case against Milgram begins to fall
apart. Milgram claimed that his subjects suffered nothing beyond the ordinary stress
that they might have outside of the laboratory. To hear Milgram tell it, most subjects
felt positively toward the experiment. . ., four-fifths of the subjects felt that
more experiments of this sort should be carried out, and 74% indicated that
© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2001
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they had learned something of personal importance. ... At no

subjects exposed to danger and at no point did they run the risk o
effects resulting from participation. [29]

Milgram also reported that a handful of subjects volunteered for

from having self-knowledge imposed or inflicted upon them, the sub

largely found the whole affair worthwhile. Now, we can suppose
Milgram polled weren't to be trusted. For the sake of argument,

really were harmed, and either didn't realize it or couldn't come to t

ting it. The problem is, we still can't argue that the deception in
caused their suffering. The several subjects who reported feelings

that they injured others. Ironically, however, this causal link is precis

deceived about. Milgram's assistants were simply acting as if they we

Since the assistants only pretended to be shocked, for all of the s

obedience to authority, they injured no one. Subjects may well have s

realization that they would have hurt people, had the apparatus

there is no proof that the deception would have had a role in whethe

made the decision to do that. If anything, one would expect that
Milgram provided, including sounds of people in pain, would hav
subjects from following orders, not enticed them. It is worth not

accused his critics of being disturbed by his experimental results. Th
truth in this, as it is easy to make deception the scapegoat for researc

unsettling [30]. Milgram's work may have inflicted an insight up

react by blaming the messenger for the perceived bad news. Milgram

provided insight into the power of the experimental situation, an

weigh competing moral judgments about risk and benefit in that sit
In any event, when interpreting these experiments we cannot overlo
between alleging that an experiment is immoral and showing that th
it so. I am no cheerleader for deception, and do not suggest that the
are immune from criticism. If nothing else, we might fault Milgram

insight that he had no right to explore, much less share. Milgram

shown more concern for the welfare of his subjects before, during, or

But there is no clear connection between any harm and the decep
among the wrongs that Milgram committed, the fact that he rel
appears almost secondary. The deception was designed into the exper
way that it could not have led anyone into doing something that he or she, presum
ably, would not have done otherwise. Also, if we are going to dwell on the prospect
that subjects might learn too much, we may be forced into asserting that any infliction
of momentary, negative thoughts constitutes abuse. By that reasoning, classroom pencil
and-paper tests can inflict an unwanted insight on test-takers. Non-deceptive experi
ments that delve into intelligence or intellectual talent can leave subjects with doubts
about themselves. Under the right (or wrong) conditions, a mirror can inflict the type
of harm that some critics associate with deception.
Then there is the historical question. Should ongoing discussions about research
ethics draw so heavily upon experiments that were exceptional in their own time, and
would be so today? Can studies that occurred nearly 40 years ago further our work
towards the goal of assessing the morality of the average experiment today? The Milgram
© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2001
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studies could serve this purpose if we better understood what they meant in their own
time, and what they should mean to us today. Clarke speaks of a 'lack of evidence of
broad acceptance for deceptive practices in social science research. If there were such
acceptance,' he hints, 'then it seems unlikely that. . . the Milgram experiment[s] would
have raised such controversy' [31]. Yet it is easy to overstate the degree of consensus
that exists on anything related to the obedience studies, including the deception. And
what real 'controversy' did the Milgram studies cause? No one disputes the familiarity
of what I have heard people refer to as 'those Milgram experiments.' Unfortunately, a
caricature of the Milgram studies has made its way into the world's cultural imagina
tion; Milgram may be the only social psychologist to earn the status of pop-icon. Plays

and novels are based on the Milgram myth [32]. In one episode of the popular
American television cartoon, The Simpsons family visits a psycho-therapist [33]. He
diagnoses the family members as suffering from pent-up hostility. He then encourages

the Simpsons to release this by administering shocks to each other while they are
strapped into chairs forming a circle. (The Simpsons quickly shock each other with
enough intensity for the lights in the building to start to blink.) College texts in ethics,

political science, and of course psychology excerpt from Milgram's narrative of his
work, Obedience to Authority. Students are thus introduced to the Milgram myth as
commonly as they are to the 'banality of evil' slogan [34],
This specious familiarity is regrettable, since it detracts attention from the need to

understand these studies in moral and methodological terms [35]. Perusing the liter
ature since Milgram first documented an obedience study in 1963, one cannot but
notice how little in fact has been written on deception since then. In the field of
bioethics too, the mass of parenthetical citations of Milgram greatly outnumbers the
number of careful studies. All this goes to show that popular exposure is no substitute
for in-depth analysis. And while there is nothing wrong with the continued interest in
Milgram's work, parading this episode from the history of human studies whenever we
argue over deception will not provide lasting results. On the contrary, the reflexive use
of references to Milgram can be comparable to referring to Nazi eugenics programmes

anytime the issue of human cloning arises. It startles people into silence, but rarely
informs anyone.

Closing Thoughts
The easy way that commentators invoke the Milgram myth illustrates an interesting

facet of this debate over deception. Critics and defenders of deception alike argue
along very conventional, almost partisan, lines [36]. Advocates, we have seen, portray
deception as a technical or design necessity. From this position, they can brand critics

anti-progressives. Some defenders would shift the burden of proof, and insist that
'those who would urge social psychologists to abandon deception must invent and
promote other alternative techniques that permit the efficient and systematic study of
social behavior' [37]. This is an irresponsible evasion, and does not advance the
discussion. Clarke and others are correct when they remind us of how little incentive
psychologists have to look for alternatives to deception [38],
At the same time, critics typically argue that deception is harmful, but fail to provide
evidence. Some look to the moral high ground of dignity and autonomy, claiming that
Society for Applied Philosophy, 2001
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the true harm from deception is in principle, not to be ascertained
the subjects in experiments like Milgram's suffer no lasting harm,

can be harmed in ways that we cannot weigh in the utilitarian s

benefits. These critics are on the right track, as we have seen. Neit

nor empirical studies can capture all of the potential drawbacks

the most abstract argument must end in the practical realm of rese

It is there that we must turn to explaining how subjects, by the
unharmed, should be given less of a say than appeal to principle or

To break from narrow patterns of debate, we might look for
about what most seem to agree are the primary moral issues. Ta
evidence concerning the effects of deception. Gathering more data
a poor idea unless we can clarify what role these data, along with d
are to play in the argument. By the same token, talk of enforcing
consent routine will only be productive if we can elaborate on t

standard. Finally, while research ethics cannot afford to forget its h

history are only as useful as they are grounded in fact and logic.
C. D. Herrera, Philosophy Department, Montclair State University,
07043, USA. Herrerach@mail.montclair.edu
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[36] There are exceptions, of course, but these too tend to stay within the convention

Cf. R. Rosenthal (1994) Science and ethics in conducting, analyzing, and report
research, Psychological Science, 5, 127-134; and C. P. Smith (1981) How (un)accepta
involving deception?, IRB, 3, 1-4.
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